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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ALLEN C. WINTERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
I 13997

W. S. HATCH CO.,
Defendant-Respondent.,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Allen C. Wintecrs appeals from a judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, granting respondent a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and against plaintiff of no cause of action.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant obtained a jury verdict on special interrogatories for damages for personal injuries against respondent and thereafter the Court below granted re-
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spondent's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks the reversal of the Court below and
reinstatement of the verdict of the jury with directions
that judgment be entered thereon.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant filed a complaint seeking damages from
defendant for personal injuries arising out of an accident
caused by respondent in the State of Nevada (R-138).
Thereafter a trial by jury was held. Respondent's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the case was
denied (T. 441). Appellant was given judgment on the
special verdict (R-54-59). The jury was submitted the
issues of respondent's negligence, appellant's contributory negligence, and damages on special interrogatories.
All eight jurors found respondent to be negligent and
that the negligence was the proximate cause of appellant's
injuries (R-55). Six of the jurors found appellant not
to be negligent while two found he was (R-55).
After the entry of the judgment respondent sought
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative a new trial. The Court below granted respondent's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, set
aside the judgment on special verdict, and gave judgment against appellant of no cause of action (R-13).
The motion for new trial was denied (R-2).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DENIED APPELLANT HIS
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL BY GRANTING
RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
The law in Utah and Nevada is virtually indistinguishable in considering the standards governing the
granting of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
This Court has often dealt with varying fact situations and determined the propriety of a lower court's
ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. In Koer v. Mayjield Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339,
431 P. 2d 566 (1967), a slip and fall case, the plaintiff
got a jury verdict and the trial court granted a judgment
n.o.v. for defendant. The jury had the issues of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence before it on special interrogatories and found for
plaintiff on both issues. This Court, on the evidence in
in the case, sustained the lower court's action, but pointed
out that a trial count,, in passing on a motion for a judgment n.o.v., can only enter such a judgment for one
reason — "the absence of any substantial evidence to
support the verdict." This Court then examined in detail
the evidence, as must be done in each case, and concluded
that there was no substantial evidence to support the
jury's verdict.
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This Court has also recognized the other basic considerations involved in granting a judgment n.o.v. In
Schow v. Guardtone, 18 Utah 2d 135, 417 P. 2d 693
(1966), this court noted that trial courts should exercise
reluctance and caution in interfering with the parties'
desires for a jury trial. Whenever a judgment n.o.v. is
granted, as in Schow and this case, the right to jury trial
is eliminated entirely. This Court was acutely aware of
this in Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P. 2d 77
(1964), when it said, 394 P. 2d at 79:
In appraising this action of the trial court,
it is important to distinguish between the granting of a new trial and the entering of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As to the
former, the trial court is indeed endowed with
a wide latitude of discretion in granting a new
trial when he thinks the jury's vredict results
in manifest injustice. This power is necessary
to fulfill his function of maintaining general
supervision over litigation to guard against miscarriages of justice which sometimes occur at
the hands of juries. Allowing this broad discretion in the trial court to grant new trials does
not deprive the parties of a fair trial by jury,
but on the contrary, assures it. However, the
granting of a judgment n.o.v. does completely
override the jury and their verdict and thus
effectively deprives the party of his right to a
jury trial. Therefore, this can properly be done
only when under the evidence and the law there
is no reasonable basis in the evidence, or lack of
it, to justify the verdict given.
This Court more recently dealt with this same issue
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in Flyrm v. Harlin Const. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.
2d 356 (1973). In that case the plaintiff received a jury
verdict on two issues. The trial court granted defendant's
motion previously made for a directed verdict on one of
those issues. While a judgment n.o.v. was not involved,
the same standards apply. See, e.g. Koer, supra. This
Court critically analyzed the trial court's reasoning in
granting defendant's motion and reversed his action and
reinstated the verdict and ordered judgment thereon.
This Court noted that the court was being very conscientious to see justice done, but in so doing the tirial
court usurped the jury's function. The trial court commented on credibility of witnesses, a prerogative belonging solely to the jury. This Court stated the rules
and rationale well:
We have no doubt that it is salutary for a
trial judge to desire to be actively involved in
the trial and to be eager to see that justice is
done. Nevertheless, under our system of justice^,
it is neither essential nor desirable that the resolution of disputed questions of fact be forced
into the exact mold of thought of any particular
individual or judge. When a party has so requested, he is entitled to a trial by a jury of his
fellow citizens. In order that that right be safeguarded as it should be, it is essential that the
jury have the exclusive prerogative of passing
upon the credibility of the evidence and of determining the facts.
Therefore, no matter how ardent may be
the trial judge's desire to see that justice is done
from his own point of view, he has an obligation
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of judicial restraint: to make allowance for the
fact that other reasonable minds might arrive at
a different conclusion than his own. This requirement of disciplined objectivity, in letting
someone else have their way, and of letting justice be done from someone else's point of view,
is one of the most difficult to achieve, and also
one of the highest and most desirable of judicial
qualities. Yet, unless this principle is applied
in practical operation, the right of trial by jury
becomes but a delusion. The jury is permitted
to go meaninglessly through all of the procedures
of the trial and render the verdict, but only on
the undisclosed condition that, unless its verdict
agrees with the thinking of the trial judge, it
will be set aside and held for naught. This case
with everything involved therein, including eight
days of trial, is a prime example of the futility
and frustrations in such procedure. It offers to
plaintiff the hollow satisfaction of vindicating
his contention that defendants had wrongfully
terminated his contract, but deprives him of any
material redress therefor. This is not what was
intended by the right of trial by jury.
It has long been established in our law that
a court should not take the case from the jury
where there is any substantial dispute in the
evidence on issues of fact, but can properly do
so only when the matter is so plain that there
really is no conflict in the evidence upon which
reasonable minds could differ. As was said for
this court long ago by the greatly respected
Justice Prick:
. . . unless the question is free from doubt,
the court cannot pass upon it as a matter
of law . . ,
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. . . if . . . the court is in doubt whether
reasonable m e n , . . . might arrive at different
conclusions, then this very doubt determines
the question to be one of fact for the jury
and not one of law for the court.
It should be plain from what has been said
above that there was such a dispute in the evidence here, and that the court was correct in his
rulings during the trial: in admitting the evidence, and in submitting the issues to the jury.
Further, in passing on a motion for a judgment n.o.v.
the court is to review the evidence and all inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict.
See, e.g. Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 2d 209
(1955). Some courts have also held that even if the
evidence is undisputed a judgment n.o.v. may be improper if different inferences may reasonably be drawn
therefrom. See, e.g., Chavira v. Carnation, 77 N. M. 467,
423 P. 2d 988 (1970).
All of the above standards and rules governing judgments notwithstanding the verdict are true as to Nevada
law. That is, basically, if the facts are disputed or reasonable, men could draw different inferences from the
facts, the question is one of fact for the jury and not
one of law for the court.
If there is evidence "tending to support the verdict,
or where there is a conflict of evidence, so that the jury
could properly decide, either way, even though the conflict is such that the court would be justified in granting
a new trial," a judgment n.o.v. is not proper. Dudley
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v. Prima, 84 Nev. 549, 445 P. 2d 31 (1968). See also,
for the same rules as above stated, Sheeketski v. Bortoli,
86 Nev. 704, 475 P. 2d 675 (1970).
It is of course clear that all of the above cases are
guidelines and standards but that each case must turn
on its own facts. In some of the above cases the court
concluded, applying the above standards, that there was
no substantial or reasonable evidence to support the jury's
verdict. In some cases there was. In this case the issues
the court faced and the issues this court must face are
the negligence of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of appellant. The lower court did not comment on which ground the judgment n.o.v. was granted,
nor does the judgment itself reflect whether the court
ruled appellant negligent as a matter of law or respondent not negligent as a matter of law.
As to respondent's negligence the jury unanimously
found respondent negligent. The drivers of respondent's
truck, Doran Higley and De Roy Higley each testified
that they looked before pulling out and didn't see anything and then they pulled out and were hit.
De Roy Higley testified as follows:
T. Page 263, Lines 27-30; T. Page 264, Lines 1-21:
Q. Is — I say, teU me what then occurred,
what happens?
A. Well, we started to merge and I definitely looked and I didn't see anything, and he
made the comment that — or I did, I suppose
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that, "Well, there's nothing coming," so we were
on our way.
Q. Well, did your partner look with you?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. And by what means did he look?
A. Well, by turning his head to the left.
A. Yes, sir, uh-huh.
Q. Which would be looking west?
A. Uh^huh.
Q. You were proceeding down the road
that enters onto the highway; is that right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And how did you look?
A. Well, I looked through my mirrors, but
also by leaning forward as far as I can and looking back to the left.
Q. You looked in your mirrors and looked
outside the window and back to your left; is that
correct?
A. Yes.
T. Page 266, Lines 3-6:
Q. Did you look more than once?
A. Well, yes, I did.
Q. You did?
A. I did. After I entered the traffic lane
and I still never seen anything.
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From an analysis of the pireceding testimony of the
driver, he indicated that he looked before merging and
saw nothing. He obviously did not see the appellant's
vehicle which was clearly there to be seen.
Applying the above rules, it is abundantly clear that
the testimony of De Roy Higley alone is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict as to respondent's
negligence. Clearly the lower court applying the substantial evidence test erred reversibly if it granted a
judgment n.o.v. if it ruled as a matter of law respondent
was not negligent. The jury, upon proper instructions,
unanimously concluded respondent was negligent. To
rule that as a matter of law respondent was not negligent
would be to say the entire jury did not have a reasonable
mind on it. In this case the court denied respondent's
motion for a directed verdict at the end of the case. This
would indicate, in the language of this court from Flynn,
supra, that the matter was not "free from doubt" and
that the lower court had a question as to what reasonable
minds would do so he submitted it to the jury, who,
being reasonable minds, decided the matter.
The identical analysis applies to the issue of appellant's contributory negligence. Reasonable minds decided
six to two that appellant was not negligent. The testimony that the jury could have relied on, and the inferences therefrom, is extensive and has its source in
various witnesses. The following is exemplary:
Testimony of Al Winters; T. Page 47, Lines 28-30,
T. Page 48, Lines 1-3, 21-25:
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A. I — when I left the cafe I got in my
truck and I drove down the street a ways and
turned up on the freeway, and I was going down
the freeway, I can remember drinking some
coffee not far out of Reno, and then beyond
there — just — it's vague, but I remember some
traffic, it seems like — it seems I can recall
passing another truck somewhere.
A. No, sir. The last thing I can say for sure
that I remember was going by a truck not far
from there. I can't say exactly how far back it
was, but I can almost definitely say I did pass
— remember definitely passing that truck, like
I say it's quite vague.
T. Page 92, Lines 29, 30; T. Page 93, Lines 1-9:
Q. No, I believe you testified on direct
examination that before the accident you recall
passing another vehicle; is that right?
A. Yes, sir, I believe it is.
Q. Do you recall what kind of vehicle it
was?
A. I believe it was a semi, a set of trucks,
I think it was a tractor with two trailers.
Q. And do you recall how long a period of
time it took you to pass that vericle?
A. Not really, no, sir. It seems like I can
remember going by it fairly fast like it was going
a bit slower.
Testimony of James Owen Frei; T. Page 197, Lines
13-21:
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A. If we — we ran this test to determine
the visibility factor and also to get the speed
factor, but as we approached back in this area
that's here, we flashed our light in the truck I
was riding it, and this second truck that was
stopped started to accelerate so both vehicles
would reach the area the accident occurred in at
approximately the same time, and with him
moving I could say the visibility was obstructed,,
and then the taillights were at all times visible,
was only obstructed for 500 or a thousand feet.
T. Page 215, Lines 18-30:
Q. Did you ever pass another truck as you
were proceeding to that area?
A. No. We were passed by several cars,
but not trucks.
Q. And which lane of traffic were you proceeding in?
A. We were in the right-hand lane.
Q. Did you ever pass another truck and go
to the inside lane and then come back to the outside lane?
A. No, we didn't.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether
your view would ever have been obstructed had
you passed a truck?
A. It would have been temporarily obstructed.
Q. Depending on where you passed the vehicle?
A. Well, yes, certainly.
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Testimony of Douglas McNaught, T. Page 239, Lines
9-13:
Q. Do you recall seeing clearance lights
on either truck?
A. I can't honestly recall seeing clearance
lights, but I can only say in my own mind for
me to recognize them as trucks —
Mr. McNaught after the accident testified concerning his recollection of the lights on the Haibchco vehicle:
T. Page 241, Lines 25, 26:
A. I was able to make out the rear end of
the tank truck, whether the lights were on or
not, I can't recall.
Testimony of Doran L. Higley, T. Page 278, Lines
6-30; T. Page 279, Lines 1-10:
Q. How many times on April 24 of 1974 did
you testify that — or April 25 of 1974 did you
testify that you brought your vehicle to a stop
prior to entering the highway?
MR. JENSEN: I will object to this as
argumentative, repetitive. He has gone into this.
The witness has admitted changing a certain
number of times.
THE COURT: Well, the objection — what
do you claim for this? The witness has testified
that he — he changed his mind. His recollection
at the time of the deposition was taken was that
he did stop.
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MR. ATHAY: It's a prior inconsistent
statement. I think the Jury is entitled to know
how many times he made that prior inconsistent
statement. That's what I claim for it.
THE COURT: Well, the fact that he made
it more than once on the same day, I think the
objection is well taken. It's sustained.
Q. (By Mr. Athay) Mr. Higley, is your
recollection better now than it was on April 25
with respect to this incident?
A. I would say so.
Q. It is better now?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it better now because it's been refreshed by some other documents?
A. Well, it was proven by a tachograph for
one thing.
Q. That's with respect to the stopping?
A. Yes.
Q. How about the other areas of your testimony?
A. Well, I am in doubt.
Q. You are in doubt?
A. Such as the lights, yes. I don't know
really. I know they were on. I could say that
honestly. When we stopped, come to rest, I don't
know if the trailer lights were on.
Testimony of David Lord:
An independent expert, David Lord, attempted to
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reconstruct the accident. The following testimony can
be taken one of two ways:
1. That appellant, Allen C. Winters, had passed a
vehicle and was proceeding in a general left to right direction from the inside to the outside lane just prior to
impact, or,
2. That appellant, Allen C. Winters, had begun to
take some evasive action by heading his vehicle towards
the side of the road in an effort to avoid a collision with
the defendants' Hatchco vehicle.
T. Page 312, Lines 4-24:
A. 27-P is a gouge on asphalt, the photograph which I took in May, 1971. 26-P is a
scrape which is a close-up I took in 1971.
Q. Is there any particular angle that those
marks proceeded on?
A. Yes.
Q. At a general left to right movement?
MR. JENSEN: Well, I am going to object
to any further testimony on the grounds that
there is no showing as to their relationship to
his area.
MR. ATHAY: I am laying the foundation
to do that. That's why I am proceeding.
MR. JENSEN: I move the last answer be
stricken, Your Honor, as immaterial at this
point and no foundation shown.
THE COURT: Go ahead and show your
foundation as to what the marks are.
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Q. (By Mr. Athay) 0. K. Where were
the — can you describe the direction of the
marks?
A. In a general left to right direction on
the highway.
T. Page 321, Lines 22-30:
Q. Now, Mr. Lord, did you reach any conclusions with respect to the direction which the
F & B truck was driving?
A.

Yes.

Q. And what factors did you rely upon to
reach that conclusion?
A. Photographs of damage, the photographs of the skid marks, the skid marks that
I observed at the scene, the chops, the gouges,
the photograph of damage to the F & B truck.
T. Page 322, Lines 1-30:
Q. Would you step down and indicate
quickly and briefly to the Jury which photographs best exhibit that which you have just
described?
A. 0. K. All of them tell a little bit.
These three —
Q. Identify the exhibits as you use them.
A. Plaintiff's 17, plaintiff's 29 and plaintiff's 14. First of all, in plaintiff's 17 which is
a shot of the front of the F & B truck, you are
looking at it from the left front sort of on an
angle toward the front of the truck, you can see
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the damage carries considerably deeper on the
left side of the truck. You can see the outline
of the tank there which places it coming into
it cm an angle. You see a brief outline of the
tank here, heavier damage on the left side. It
come into it at an attitude exposing more on
the left siide of the tank — or the left side of
the vehicle to the tank. You can see a rough
outline of the tank here.
Here is the radiator which made the perpendicular marks on the back of the tank. What
I am saying is this: If this represented the
front of the F & B truck and this represented
the rear of it — of the tank, it came in —
Q. Which photographs are you referring to?
A. This would be the F & B. I am using
the photographs of the truck. This was the
front of the F & B and this was the rear of the
tank, the same is at an attitude such as this.
That's why they have much deeper damage in
the rear — or excuse me — on the left side of
the F & B truck. He drove on it. This is further evidence by the wheel that we have looked
at. It's been moved from the left to the right.
T. Page 323, Lines 1-7:
A. . . . It would take quite a bit of force
moving toward the right here of the truck to
break that axle and to move those wheels off
to the right as they have done. This would require left to right movement.
Also the characteristics of damage on the
rear of the tanker shows a right to left — or
excuse me — a left to right movement.
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Respondent put in evidence that appellant must
have been negligent or he would have seen respondent's
clearance lights. Doran Higley (T. 277) and De Roy
Htgley (R-405) testified the lights were on on their truck
when they pulled out. However, the matter is not free
from doubt. Another witness said he wasn't sure the
lights were on (T. 239). Further, as this court noted
the general rule in Flyrm, supra, the jury did not have
to believe such evidence. To say they should have is to
usurp their function as being the sole judges of witness
credibility.
\
Thus, as with the issue of respondent's negligence,
there is reasonable, substantial evidence, and inferences
therefrom, that reasonable minds could find that plaintiff was not negligent. Reasonable minds so found in the
jury room and the fact that the trial court agreed with
the two jurors who felt appellant negligent is not an
adequate reason under the law to nullify the jury system. Trial by jury should not be so easily disposed with
because the thinking of the jury did not agree with that
of the tiral court.
In short, in this case there were two basic issues,
defendant's negligence and appellant's contributory negligence, and there was a conflict in the evidence or those
issues upon which reasonable minds could differ, as witnessed by the jury's six to two vote on one of those
issues. Because that is so, it was reversible error to grant
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and nullify the
jury system.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the court below
erred and abused its discretion in granting a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for respondent, appellant
respectfully submits that the judgment of the court below be reversed, the jury verdict be reinstated, and that
judgment issue thereon.
Respectfully submitted,
D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorney for Appellant
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